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INTRODUCTION
In a time like the present, when political turmoil and
allegations of government corruption dominate our news, the Freedom
of Information Act (“FOIA”)1 should be on the forefront of every
American’s mind. FOIA was enacted in 1966 to provide the American
public with the right to access information about certain government
activities, thereby minimizing the risk of government secrecy and
corruption.2 The United States Supreme Court has stated that the
“basic purpose of the FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to
the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against
corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.”3

∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.S., May 2000, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
1
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
2
See Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act of
2005, S. 394, 109th Cong. (2005) (listing recent Congressional findings on FOIA).
3
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. (“NLRB”) v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S.
214, 242 (1978).
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Under FOIA, accessibility to information is based upon the
fundamental principle that the American people have a “right to
know,” rather than determined based on their “need to know.”4 Thus,
FOIA requires government agencies to disclose information and
records upon request and without question.5 While government
agencies are still permitted to withhold from disclosure certain
information that falls within one of FOIA’s nine exemptions,6 these
exemptions are to be narrowly construed so as to promote the statute’s
broad disclosure policy.7 Furthermore, federal courts may review an
agency’s denial of a FOIA request to determine whether the
information was improperly withheld.8
In 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit was faced with such a review in City of Chicago v. United
States Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (“ATF”), the first of what was to become a series of three
cases decided by the court regarding the City of Chicago’s (the “City”)
FOIA request from ATF.9 Pursuant to FOIA, the City had requested
data contained in two ATF databases regarding the tracing and sale of
firearms, and ATF had repeatedly refused to disclose all of the
requested information to the City, claiming that various exemptions
warranted its refusal.10
In its first two opinions, the Seventh Circuit was a champion
for public disclosure of the trace and multiple sales data, arguing
4

See S. 394 § 2.
See Alan B. Morrison, Balancing Access to Government-Controlled
Information, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 115, 117 (2006); Meredith Fuchs, Information
Regulation: Controlling the Flow of Information to and from Administrative
Agencies, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 144 (2006).
6
5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
7
See NLRB, 437 U.S. at 236; In re Wade, 969 F.2d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 1992).
8
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
9
See City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago III”), 423 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 2005);
City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago II”), 384 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2004); City of
Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago I”), 287 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2002).
10
See Chicago III, 423 F.3d 777; Chicago II, 384 F.3d 429; Chicago I, 287
F.3d 628.
5

355

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/13

2

Amiryaghoobi: The Seventh Circuit’s Statutory Interpretation Misfires, Wounding

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

incessantly that the public interest in the disclosure of this information
far outweighed any private interest or other government justification
for its withholding.11 However, in September 2005, the Seventh
Circuit radically switched roles from a FOIA advocate to a FOIA foe
in the court’s third and final City of Chicago opinion.12 In this final
opinion, the Seventh Circuit held that Congress effectively changed
the substantive law under FOIA, and completely banned the disclosure
of this information to the public, by inserting a rider in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 (“2005 rider”),13 granting
the information in question immunity from legal process.14 In doing
so, the court gave a significant and misplaced amount of weight to the
apparent intent of Congress to ban the information from disclosure and
quickly set aside established principles of statutory interpretation and
construction to reach a convenient but faulty conclusion.15
Part I of this Note sets out the factual and procedural
background of the three City of Chicago decisions and details the
reasoning and holding of each decision. Part II discusses the Seventh
Circuit’s faulty interpretation of the 2005 rider in greater detail. Part
III describes the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York’s more logical interpretation of the same statutory text.
Finally, Part IV compares the two interpretations and examines more
specifically the flaws and possible impact of the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO LITIGATION
Since late 1998, the City of Chicago has attempted,
unsuccessfully, to gain access to firearms sales and trace records

11

See Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 435-36; Chicago I, 287 F.3d at 637-38.
See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 784.
13
Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, 2859-60, codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 923 (2004).
14
Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 782.
15
See id. at 780-82.
12
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contained in two databases compiled and maintained by ATF.16 The
City’s long and documented struggle to retrieve these records began in
response to a separate action it brought against certain manufacturers,
distributors, and dealers of firearms, who the City claimed created a
public nuisance by intentionally marketing firearms to Chicago
residents and other residents likely to use or possess the weapons in
Chicago.17 The City alleged that the defendants’ conduct interfered
with the City’s ability to enforce its gun control ordinances.18
Therefore, pursuant to FOIA, the City requested specific information
from ATF’s Multiple Sales and Trace Databases (“Trace Data”) in an
effort to determine the distribution practices of these gun
manufacturers and establish liability.19
ATF is a law enforcement agency within the United States
Department of Justice20 which, among other things, is responsible for
the enforcement of federal criminal laws and the regulation of the
firearms industry.21 The Seventh Circuit stated that “ATF has
acknowledged that its missions include analysis of firearm distribution
and trafficking patterns, aiding local governments to enforce their own
gun control laws and informing the public of the nature and extent of
16

See City of Chicago v. ATF, 2001 WL 34088619, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8,

2001).
17

See City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago I”), 287 F.3d 628, 631 (7th Cir.
2002); City of Chicago, 2001 WL 34088619, at *1; see generally City of Chicago v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1148 (Ill. 2004) (holding in favor of the
defendant by refusing to extend the law of nuisance to apply to the state and
federally regulated firearms industry and stating that the regulation of the
manufacture, distribution and sale of firearms should be left to the legislature, not the
courts).
18
See Chicago I, 287 F.3d at 631.
19
Id.
20
6 U.S.C. § 531-33 (transferring ATF from the Department of Treasury to the
Department of Justice, with the exception of ATF’s administration and revenue
collection functions, and establishing an explosives training and research facility
with the Bureau. ATF is now known as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives).
21
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, About ATF,
http://www.atf.gov/about/mission.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2006).

357

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/13

4

Amiryaghoobi: The Seventh Circuit’s Statutory Interpretation Misfires, Wounding

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

illegal gun trafficking.”22 These gun control laws include the Gun
Control Act (“GCA”), which requires firearms manufacturers,
importers, dealers and collectors to disclose certain information to
ATF.23 As part of its duties, ATF then compiles and maintains the
information in comprehensive databases.24 During the last decade,
ATF has refused to disclose and has fiercely fought to prevent the
disclosure of the content of these databases to cities, including the City
of Chicago, and private organizations around the country.25
The first database at issue in the City of Chicago litigation was
the “Trace Database,” which as its name suggests contains information
regarding the manufacture, distribution and purchase history of a
particular weapon recovered by a law enforcement agency in
connection with a crime.26 The second database, the “Multiple Sales
Database,” contains information submitted to ATF by dealers on any
non-licensed individuals who purchased two or more firearms from
the same dealer within a five-day period.27 Despite the City’s repeated
requests, ATF failed to provide the city with all of the requested Trace
Data, citing numerous reasons why the information was exempt from
disclosure.28 This four-year court battle in the Seventh Circuit ensued.
A. Chicago I - The Applicability of Exemptions 6, 7(A) and 7(C)
of FOIA
The Seventh Circuit first became involved in the City of
Chicago litigation in 2002, after the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois granted the City’s summary judgment
22

Chicago I, 287 F.3d at 637.
18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (2000).
24
See Chicago I, 287 F.3d at 631-32.
25
See City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago III”), 423 F.3d 777, 778-79 (7th Cir.
2005); City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 429 F.Supp.2d 517, 519-21
(E.D.N.Y. 2006).
26
See Chicago I, 287 F.3d at 631-32.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 632 (noting that ATF provided the City with some of the requested
information, but withheld a significant portion).
23
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motion and ATF appealed.29 The issues at both the district court level
and the initial appellate review were whether certain FOIA
exemptions, namely Exemption 6,30 Exemption 7(A),31 and Exemption
7 (C),32 permitted ATF to withhold this information from the City.33
Relying on the long established rule that exemptions to FOIA are to be
narrowly construed, the Seventh Circuit reviewed each exemption and
held that neither of the exemptions was applicable to the requested
information.34 At the end of its analysis, the court firmly stated:
Inherent in the City’s request for records is the public’s
interest in ATF’s performance of its statutory duties of
tracking, investigating and prosecuting illegal gun
29

See id. at 631; City of Chicago v. ATF, 2001 WL 34088619, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 8, 2001).
30
Exemption 6 exempts from disclosure “personnel and medical files and
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
31
Exemption 7(A) provides that records “compiled for law enforcement
purposes” are exempt from disclosure, “but only to the extent that the production of
such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to
interfere with law enforcement proceedings.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A).
32
Under Exemption 7(C), “records or information compiled for law
enforcement purposes” may be withheld “to the extent that the production of such
law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
33
City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago I”), 287 F.3d 628, 632 (7th Cir. 2002);
City of Chicago, 2001 WL 34088619, at *2.
34
Chicago I, 287 F.3d at 636. The Seventh Circuit held that the names and
addresses of individuals who purchased firearms were not of “such a sensitive nature
that their disclosure would harm or embarrass the individual,” and so, Exemption 6
did not apply. Id. The court also held that Exemption 7(C) does not apply to any of
the requested information, and noted that the purchase of a firearm does not raise any
legitimate privacy concerns as it is not a private transaction and purchasers are on
notice that their names and addresses will be reported to the proper authorities. Id. at
637. Finally, the court found that disclosure of the information in question would
not interfere with enforcement proceedings “within the meaning of Exemption 7(A)
of FOIA.” Id. at 635; see also City of Chicago v. ATF, 297 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2002)
(amending portions of the Chicago I opinion relating to FOIA Exemption 7(A)).
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trafficking, as well as determining whether stricter
regulation of firearms is necessary. . . . There is a
strong public policy in facilitating the analysis of
national patterns of gun trafficking and enabling the
City to enforce it criminal ordinances. Disclosure of
the records sought by the City will shed light on ATF’s
efficiency in performing its duties and directly serve
FOIA’s purpose in keeping the activities of government
agencies open to the sharp eye of public scrutiny.35
The court then affirmed the district court’s decision ordering ATF to
disclose the requested information to the City.36
ATF appealed the Seventh Circuit’s 2002 decision and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.37 However, while the case was
pending, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution
of 2003, which contained a rider (“2003 rider”) that prohibited the use
of appropriated funds “to take any action based upon any provision of
[FOIA] with respect to records collected or maintained pursuant to
[certain sections of the GCA],” including the information in
question.38 Thus, the Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit’s
judgment and remanded the case back to the court to determine “what
effect, if any, this rider had on the case.”39
B. Chicago II – Interpreting the 2003 and 2004 Riders
In September 2004, the Seventh Circuit rendered its second
opinion regarding the City of Chicago’s FOIA request in light of the
2003 rider and a rider contained in the Consolidated Appropriations

35

Chicago I, 287 F.3d at 637.
Id. at 638.
37
ATF v. City of Chicago, 537 U.S. 1229, 1229 (2003).
38
Id.; Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 644, 117 Stat. 11, 473-74 (2003).
39
City of Chicago, 537 U.S. at 1229.
36
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Act of 2004 (“2004 rider”).40 Both riders expressly precluded the use
of federal funds to disclose the Trace Data, and impliedly, as ATF
argued, prohibited the disclosure of the data to the public.41 This
second opinion also introduced a fourth potential exemption to the
controversy, Exemption 3,42 which permitted government agencies to
withhold information that was specifically exempt from disclosure by
another statute. 43 Therefore, the court’s task was to interpret the 2003
and 2004 riders to determine whether the funding restrictions in effect
exempted the requested data from disclosure and amounted to a
substantive change in FOIA.44
Relying once again on FOIA’s underlying policy “to establish
a general philosophy of full agency disclosure,” the court stated that
there is a “strong presumption in favor of disclosure” and that
exemptions to FOIA are to be interpreted narrowly.45 The court then
diligently began its interpretation of the 2003 and 2004 riders by first
reviewing the express language of the two acts.46 After finding no
express language in either rider exempting the information from
disclosure, the issue then became whether Congress intended to
exempt the Trace Data from disclosure, even though it did not

40

Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3, 53 (2004).; see City of Chicago v. ATF
(“Chicago II”), 384 F.3d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2004 was passed after the remand by the Supreme Court but
before the Seventh Circuit reheard the case).
41
Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 432.
42
Exemption 3 permits withholding of information that is “specifically
exempted from disclosure by statute (other than [FOIA]), provided that such statute
(A) requires that the matter be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave
no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or
refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).
43
Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 432.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 432-33 (noting that only direct language had been used to create
substantive FOIA exemptions in the past, such as language expressly indicating that
certain information “may be withheld from the public in response to a FOIA
request.”).
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explicitly indicate such intent. 47 This congressional practice is referred
to as “repeal by implication.”48 As the court noted, repeals by
implication are a disfavored practice, especially when the repeal is to
have occurred through an appropriations measure.49 While
appropriations acts are permitted to change substantive law, “there is a
strong presumption that they do not.”50 Further, in the event that
appropriations legislation conflicts with a substantive statute, the court
is to narrowly construe the appropriations legislation.51
The Seventh Circuit outlined the two instances where repeal by
implication may be found: (1) where one act is “clearly intended as a
substitute” for the other or (2) where the two statutes are in
“irreconcilable conflict.”52 The court quickly dismissed the idea that
either rider was a clearly intended substitute for portions of FOIA.53 It,
however, gave a great deal of consideration to whether FOIA and the
funding restrictions imposed by the riders were in irreconcilable
conflict.54 The court eventually came to the conclusion that there was
“no irreconcilable conflict between prohibiting the use of federal funds
to process the request and granting the City access to the databases.”55
47

Id. at 433-34.
Id. at 433.
49
Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 433 (citing Tenn. Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 189-90 (1978) (stating that “the policy [that repeals by implication are
disfavored] applies with even greater force when the claimed repeal rests solely on
an Appropriations Act, and that [the Court] recognizes that both substantive
enactments and appropriations measures are “Acts of Congress,” but the latter have
the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized programs.”).
50
Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 433.; see generally Jack M. Beermann,
Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 84-90 (2006) (briefly
discussing the controversy surrounding use of appropriations riders, and noting that
one main criticism is the ability of riders to “fly below the political radar,” by being
“placed in a bill by a few connected members of Congress and voted on by members
who may not even be aware of their presence in the bill.”).
51
Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 433.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 433-34.
54
Id. at 434-35.
55
Id. at 435.
48

362

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006

9

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 13

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

The Seventh Circuit reasoned that FOIA is mainly focused on ensuring
that the public has access to agency information, and it “only
peripherally deals with the allocation of funds.”56 Where
appropriations legislation had changed substantive law in the past, the
substantive statutes in most cases had only dealt with the transfer of
funds; thus, “by making the funds in question unavailable Congress
was able to squarely defeat the purpose of those statutes.”57
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the funding
restrictions imposed by the two riders were merely a procedural
obstacle that the City could easily overcome and advocated the City’s
suggestion to use a court-appointed special master, paid for by the
City, to retrieve the data.58 The court again affirmed the district court’s
decision and ordered ATF to disclose the Trace Data to the City.59
C. Chicago III – Interpreting the 2005 Rider
The Seventh Circuit’s third and final City of Chicago opinion
stemmed from the passage of a third rider, the 2005 rider,60 which
prompted the rehearing of the case and resulted in the reversal of the
district court’s decision.61 Like the previous two riders, the 2005 rider
precluded the use of federal funding to access the databases in
question.62 However, this new rider also contained additional language
declaring that “all such data shall be immune from legal process.”63
The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of this language, and in particular
the phrase “such data,” is the focus of the remainder of this Note and
the center of this continuing debate.

56

Id.
Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 434.
58
Id. at 436.
59
Id.
60
118 Stat. at 2859-60.
61
City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago III”), 423 F.3d 777, 778 (7th Cir. 2005).
62
Id. at 779-80.
63
Id.; 118 Stat. at 2860.
57
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The three-judge panel, consisting of Circuit Judges Bauer,
Rovner, and Williams, again heard the case in Chicago III.64 Judge
Bauer, delivering the opinion of the court, began by straightforwardly
referencing the Seventh Circuit’s history with the case: “For the third
time in four years, we consider whether [FOIA] entitles the City of
Chicago to information from the [ATF] databases regarding the sale
and tracing of firearms.”65 After a brief description of the court’s prior
decisions and the series of riders that were passed by Congress during
the pendency of the case, the court set out the language of the 2005
rider66 and jumped right into a discussion of its meaning.67
64

All three City of Chicago decisions were rendered by Judges William Bauer,
Ilana Diamond Rovner and Ann Williams, and all three opinions were delivered by
Judge Bauer. See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 778; Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 431; City of
Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago I”), 287 F.3d 628, 631 (7th Cir. 2002).
65
Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 778.
66
The 2005 rider provides:
No funds appropriated under this or any other Act with respect to
any fiscal year may be used to disclose part or all of the contents
of the Firearms Trace System database maintained by the National
Trace Center of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives or any information required to be kept by licensees
pursuant to section 923(g) of title 18, United States Code, or
required to be reported pursuant to paragraphs (3) and (7) of such
section 923(g), to anyone other than a Federal, State, or local law
enforcement agency or a prosecutor solely in connection with and
for use in a bona fide criminal investigation or prosecution and
then only such information as pertains to the geographic
jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency requesting the
disclosure and not for use in any civil action or proceeding other
than an action or proceeding commenced by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, or a review of such
an action or proceeding, to enforce the provisions of chapter 44 of
such title [18 USCS §§ 921 et seq.], and all such data shall be
immune from legal process and shall not be subject to subpoena or
other discovery in any civil action in a State or Federal court or in
any administrative proceeding other than a proceeding commenced
by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives to
enforce the provisions of that chapter, or a review of such an
action or proceeding; except that this proviso shall not be
construed to prevent the disclosure of statistical information
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With little elaboration, the Seventh Circuit agreed with ATF
that the 2005 rider dramatically changed the legal landscape since the
court’s 2004 opinion.68 The court stated: “Congress’ obvious intention
in adding the ‘immune from legal process’ language to the funding
restriction that existed under prior riders was to cut off access to the
databases for any reason not related to law enforcement.”69 In short,
the court interpreted the new rider as prohibiting ATF from acting on
any request for disclosure of the Trace Data, and providing the
requesting party with no judicial remedy.70 This reading of the 2005
rider also made Chicago II’s court-appointed special master solution
untenable, as the court determined that such a court order was
unquestionably “legal process” and prohibited under the provisions of
the new rider.71 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit held that the 2005
rider qualified as an Exemption 3 statute and substantively changed
FOIA law by exempting from disclosure data to which the public was
previously entitled.72 The court reversed the district court’s judgment
and released ATF from its obligation to give the City access to the
Trace Data.73

concerning total production, importation, and exportation by each
licensed importer (as defined in section 921(a)(9) of such title) and
licensed manufacturer (as defined in section 921(a)(10) of such
title).
118 Stat. at 2859-60 (emphasis added highlighting relevant 2005 additions).
67
Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 779-80.
68
Id. at 780.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 781; see also City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago II”), 384 F.3d 429,
436 (7th Cir. 2004) (advocating the use of a court-appointed special master to
retrieve the data).
72
Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 782. The court also heard and dismissed the City’s
separation of powers and first amendment arguments, which are beyond the scope of
this Note.
73
Id. at 784.
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II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S FAULTY INTERPRETATION
Unlike most statutory interpretation cases, the Seventh Circuit
did not lay out any rules or guidelines in its opinion by which to
interpret the language of the 2005 rider in Chicago III.74 Instead, the
court purported to know, from the very beginning, the clear meaning
of the language, the structure, and the intent of the 2005 rider.75 In its
analysis, the court repeatedly stated that Congress’ intent to cut off
access to the Trace Data was clear and unmistakable, citing both the
use of the language “immune from legal process” and the history of
the litigation as its reasoning.76
In fact, throughout the opinion, the Seventh Circuit
predominantly focused on the language “immune from legal process,”
and only incidentally addressed the immediately preceding language
“such data.”77 Even then, the court reluctantly considered the
possibility that the language “such data” limited the application of the
rider to the Trace Data in any way.78 In its only mention of the
construction of the rider and the language “such data,” the court noted:
“The only data mentioned in the paragraph prior to the reference to
“such data” is the tracing data and the data regarding multiple sales,
and those data are the clear antecedent to the phrase ‘such data.’”79
With this statement, the court surprisingly disregarded all of the
language contained after the reference to the tracing and multiple sales
data and before the reference to “such data.”80 The court also did not
address any other language or structural aspects of the 2005 rider.81
74

See id. at 778-79.
Id.
76
Chicago III, 423 F.3d. at 780, 782.
77
Id. at 780-82.
78
Id. at 780-81.
79
Id.
80
See id. The 2005 rider states, in part:
No funds appropriated under this or any other Act with respect to
any fiscal year may be used to disclose part or all of [the Trace
Data], to anyone other than a Federal, State, or local law
enforcement agency or a prosecutor solely in connection with and
75
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Finally, the court ignored its own language from Chicago II
regarding the proper treatment and priority accorded appropriations
legislation which purported to change substantive law, 82 and quickly
dismissed the City’s policy concerns on the matter, citing, yet again,
Congress’ clear intent as its reasoning.83 The court stated: “Even if we
shared [the City and various amici’s] concerns . . . we cannot ignore
clear expressions of Congressional intent, regardless of whether the
end product is an appropriations rider or a statute that has proceeded
through the more typical avenues of deliberation.”84 The court did not
address any of FOIA’s policy considerations.85
III. A MORE LOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF “SUCH DATA”
A. Background: City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.
The Seventh Circuit’s faulty reading of the language “such
data” in the 2005 rider is identified and critiqued in the factually

for use in a bona fide criminal investigation or prosecution and
then only such information as pertains to the geographic
jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency requesting the
disclosure and not for use in any civil action or proceeding other
than an action or proceeding commenced by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, or a review of such
an action or proceeding, to enforce the provisions of chapter 44 of
such title [18 USCS §§ 921 et seq.], and all such data shall be
immune from legal process.
118 Stat. at 2859-60 (emphasis added highlighting the language disregarded
by the court).
81
See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 780-782.
82
See City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago II”), 384 F.3d 429, 433 (7th Cir.
2004) (noting that there is “a very strong presumption” that appropriations acts do
not substantively change existing law, and that when appropriations legislation and a
substantive statute are in conflict, the appropriations legislation is to be construed
narrowly).
83
Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 782.
84
Id.
85
Id.
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similar case of City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.86 Like the
City of Chicago, the City of New York had brought a nuisance suit
against the handgun industry for its use of “improper merchandising
methods that create unnecessary hazards to the people in the City [of
New York].”87 During discovery, the City of New York served ATF
with a subpoena to compel disclosure of certain trace data.88 ATF
refused to comply and argued that the 2004 rider, the same rider that
was reviewed by the Seventh Circuit in Chicago II, barred the
disclosure of the requested data.89 Similar to the Seventh Circuit’s
holding in Chicago II, the magistrate judge at the Eastern District of
New York held, and the district court later affirmed, that the 2004
rider only prohibited the use of appropriated funds in making a
disclosure, and not the disclosure itself.90
After finding no support with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, ATF produced some of the requested
data to the City of New York, and the City of New York filed a motion
to compel the production of the remaining data.91 By this time, the
2005 rider had gone into effect and ATF cited the new immunity
provision of the 2005 rider as grounds for withholding the data.92
However, rather than interpret the language of the 2005 rider at that
time, the magistrate judge held, and the district court affirmed, that
“the [2005] rider could not retroactively relieve ATF of a
responsibility that [the judge] ordered it to respond to before the rider

86

429 F.Supp.2d at 529.
Id. at 519.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 520-21; see City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago II”), 384 F.3d 429, 436
(7th Cir. 2004).
90
City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 520-21; see Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 436;
see also City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 51, 54 (E.D.N.Y.
2004); Johnson v. Bryco Arms, 222 F.R.D. 48, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
91
City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 521.
92
Id.
87
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was passed.”93 Thus, ATF was left with no choice but to turn over the
data to the City of New York.94
Nonetheless, in April 2006, the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York was faced with the task of interpreting a rider
located within the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006 (“2006 rider”)95 in City of New
York.96 The 2006 rider was identical to the 2005 rider, but also
included additional language directly after the 2005 immunity
provision making “such data…inadmissible in evidence.”97 Thus, the
City of New York court was faced with the task of interpreting the
language “such data,” the same language which the Seventh Circuit

93

Id. at 522; see also City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 228 F.R.D.
134, 146-147 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 228
F.R.D. 147, 157 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
94
City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 522.
95
Pub. L. No. 109-108, 119 Stat. 2290, 2295-96 (2005).
96
429 F.Supp.2d at 522.
97
Compare 119 Stat. at 2295-96, with 118 Stat. at 2859-60. The 2006 rider
provides, in part:
No funds appropriated under this or any other Act with respect to
any fiscal year may be used to disclose part or all of the [Trace
Data], to anyone other than a Federal, State, or local law
enforcement agency or a prosecutor solely in connection with and
for use in a bona fide criminal investigation or prosecution and
then only such information as pertains to the geographic
jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency requesting the
disclosure and not for use in any civil action or proceeding other
than an action or proceeding commenced by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, or a review of such
an action or proceeding, to enforce the provisions of chapter 44 of
such title [18 USCS §§ 921 et seq.], and all such data shall be
immune from legal process and shall not be subject to subpoena or
other discovery, shall be inadmissible in evidence, and shall not be
used, relied on, or disclosed in any manner, nor shall testimony or
other evidence be permitted based upon such data, in any civil
action pending on or filed after the effective date of this Act in any
State (including the District of Columbia) or Federal court.
119 Stat. at 2295-96 (emphasis added highlighting relevant 2006 additions).
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determined had one and only one possible meaning – all of the Trace
Data.98
B. The Eastern District of New York’s Interpretation of “Such Data”
The City of New York court began its analysis of the 2006 rider
by setting out the appropriate method of statutory interpretation.99
First, a court should look at the plain language of the statute and
consider both the bare meaning of the words and their placement and
purpose in the statutory scheme.100 Second, a court may take into
account broader congressional policies and “Congress’ awareness of
its own responsibility to promote the ends of justice in the federal
court system.”101 Finally, if necessary, a court may look at the
legislative history of the act.102
The district court then proceeded to conduct a careful review of
the entire appropriations act, noting first and foremost that the rider
was a budgetary provision enacted as part of a vastly larger federal
spending bill.103 After reviewing the entire section of the
appropriations act in which the rider appeared, and paying close
attention to the context in which the language at issue appeared, the
court concluded that the phrase “such data” could only refer to the data
to be disclosed to law enforcement agencies, since that was the only
data for which the use of federal funds was permitted.104 The court
reasoned:
The 2006 rider bars the use of appropriated funds for
the future disclosure of ATF trace data to anyone
98

City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 523; see City of Chicago v. ATF
(“Chicago III”), 423 F.3d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 2005).
99
City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 523-24.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 524.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 526.
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besides law enforcement recipients and then imposes
further restrictions in order to ensure the proper use of
data that has been so disclosed. The rider has no
application to data that is not to be disclosed through
the use of federally appropriated funds.105
The court went on to provide further support for this reading of
the phrase “such data” by reviewing the grammatical structure of the
rider.106 In this effort, the City of New York court focused on the
portion of the rider which states:
No funds appropriated under this or any other Act . . .
may be used to disclose part or all of the contents of
[the Trace Data] to anyone other than a Federal, State,
or local law enforcement agency . . . and then only such
information as pertains to the geographic jurisdiction
of the law enforcement agency requesting the
disclosure. 107
Unquestionably, the phrase “such information” can only refer to data
that is to be revealed to law enforcement agencies, as indicated by the
phrase “the law enforcement agency requesting the disclosure.”108
Therefore, if the phrase “such data” also referred to the data to be
disclosed to law enforcement agencies, then the term “such” would
have the same meaning throughout the rider.109 Interpreting identical

105

Id.
Id.
107
119 Stat. at 2295-96. The 2006 rider is identical in language and structure
to the 2005 rider, with the exception of the evidentiary restriction language inserted
after the phrase “such data shall be immune from the legal process.” See supra note
97.
108
City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 526.
109
Id.
106
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words used in different parts of the same act to have the same meaning
is the favored practice and the more logical interpretation.110
Moreover, the court highlighted Congress’ use of the phrase
“and then only,” which directly precedes “such information” in the
passage above, as an indication that Congress intended to impose one
restriction, then apply further restrictions to the originally limited
subject.111 Under this view, the rider would effectively read as follows:
“ATF may only use the funds being appropriated to release data to law
enforcement recipients ‘and then only’ subject to the restrictions
which follow.”112 Such a reading of the phrase “and then only” is in
line with the common use of the phrase in other statutes.113
Finally, aware of the recent Seventh Circuit decision
interpreting the same language in the 2005 rider, the court noted that it
“read the decision with interest” and “most respectfully disagree[d]
with the conclusion of [the Seventh Circuit] in that case.”114 While the
court acknowledged that the facts in Chicago III differed from the
facts in City of New York, 115 the court believed that the Seventh
Circuit’s interpretation of “such data” was nonetheless erroneous.116
The court stated:
Contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s reading, there are in
fact two grammatically possible antecedents to the
phrase “such data” in both the 2005 and the 2006
riders. “Such data” could, as [Chicago III] concluded,
110

Id. (citing United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.,
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988); Sorensen v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860
(1986)).
111
City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 526.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 528.
115
Id. at 528-29 (noting that ATF had already disclosed the data in question to
the City of New York pursuant to a court order, whereas in Chicago III, a significant
portion of the data was never disclosed); see City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago
III”), 423 F.3d 777, 778-79 (7th Cir. 2005).
116
City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 528-29.
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refer to the more general description of the ATF data in
the first few lines of the riders, but, as already noted
above, it could also refer to the data to be revealed in
future disclosures to law enforcement officials. For the
contextual and grammatical reasons already explained,
the latter is the more appropriate antecedent to “such
data.”117
However, in its concluding statements, the court still urged an
immediate appeal of the case, noting that there was “substantial
ground for disagreement about a controlling issue of law -- the
applicability of the 2006 rider to the present litigation.”118 Whether the
termination of this case will continue to turn on the proper reading of
the phrase “such data” or on the other congressional policy and
evidentiary concerns addressed by this case has yet to be determined.
IV. WHY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION MISSED THE MARK
A. Which Interpretation is Correct?
In stark contrast to the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Chicago
III, the City of New York court made no mention of congressional
intent in its analysis of the 2006 rider.119 Instead, the district court
focused only on established statutory interpretation and construction
principles.120 Why was there such a drastic disparity in the two
interpretations? Surely, no court can deny that with the language
“immune from legal process” Congress intended to exempt certain
information from disclosure. However, that was not the controlling
issue in either case.121 Rather, the controlling issue was, or should
117

Id. at 529.
Id.
119
Compare Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 780-82, with City of New York, 429 F.
Supp. 2d at 523-26.
120
See City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 523-26.
121
See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 780; City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 523.
118
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have been, which category of information Congress intended to
exempt or restrict through its use of the phrase “such data.”122 The
Seventh Circuit’s unwavering focus on the former clouded its
judgment and interpretation of the latter.123 The City of New York
court, not tied to the “immune from legal process” language, was able
to engage in a more logical and correct interpretation of “such data.”124
When evaluating issues of statutory interpretation, courts are
to “give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been
expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive.”125 Undoubtedly, the Seventh Circuit
considered this rule of statutory interpretation during its analysis, even
though it did not explicitly state it.126 However, it is less clear from the
opinion whether the court was guided by other established principles
of statutory interpretation.127
The Seventh Circuit has previously noted that the statute’s text
is regarded as the “best evidence of the statute’s purpose.”128
Therefore, courts must strive to “give effect . . . to every clause and
word of a statute.”129 At the bare minimum, a court interpreting a
provision of a statute is to “account for a statute’s full text, language,
as well as punctuation, structure, and subject matter.”130 In a case
decided by the Seventh Circuit just months before Chicago III, the
court applied such principles to a particular statute and began its
122

Id.
See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 780-82.
124
See City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 523-26. Although the court in City
of New York interpreted the language “such data,” the same language interpreted by
the Seventh Circuit, the language “immune from legal process” was not part of or
relevant to the district court’s analysis. Id.
125
Lifschultz Fast Freight Corp. v. Medici, 63 F.3d 621, 628 (7th Cir. 1995)
(citing Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993)).
126
See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 780-82 (focusing much of the analysis on
congressional intent).
127
Id.
128
Lifschultz, 63 F.3d at 628.
129
Id.
130
Id.
123
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inquiry with the following question: “whether the language at issue
had a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular
dispute in the case.”131 The court noted that the “plainness or
ambiguity of the statutory language is determined by reference to the
language itself, the context in which the language is used, and the
broader context of the statute as a whole.”132 If the court determined
that the statutory language was unambiguous and the statutory scheme
was coherent and consistent, its inquiry would end.133
In Chicago III, the Seventh Circuit appears to have ended its
inquiry as soon as it determined what it perceived to be the
congressional intent, and the actual text and structure of the 2005 rider
was merely a backdrop to its analysis.134 This is particularly evident
during the court’s interpretation of the phrase “such data.”135 In
response to the City’s argument that the phrase “such data” only
referred to the data requested by law enforcement agencies, the
Seventh Circuit stated:
Under the City’s strained construction of the statute, the
portion of the databases in law enforcement’s hands
would be ‘immune from legal process,’ but the
remaining portion of the databases, the extensive data
not produced to law enforcement, would be accessible
to anyone willing to pay for it. Such a reading would
thwart Congress’ intention to bar access to the
databases, and we accordingly reject it.136

131

Ioffe v. Skokie Motor Sales, Inc., 414 F.3d 708, 710-11 (7th Cir. 2005)
(citing Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)).
132
Ioffe, 414 F.3d at 711.
133
Id.
134
See City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago III”), 423 F.3d 777, 780-82 (7th Cir.
2005).
135
Id. at 780-81.
136
Id. at 781.
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Clearly, rather than using the rider’s text to interpret congressional
intent, the court is using its already preconceived notion of
congressional intent to interpret the text.137 In much the same way, the
court overlooked the significant limiting language included between
the reference to the Trace Data and the language “such data” in the
rider.138 As the City of New York court so distinctly pointed out, the
use of the phrases “such information” and “and then only,” which
were a part of that limiting language, were vital to the interpretation of
both the meaning of the language “such data” and the rider as a
whole.139
More significantly, the Seventh Circuit ignored FOIA’s policy
considerations, failing to even mention, as it had in its prior two
opinions, that there is a strong presumption in favor of disclosure
under FOIA and that its exemptions are to be narrowly construed.140
Instead, the Seventh Circuit adopted the broadest reading of the 2005
rider possible.141 Although there was no FOIA issue in City of New
York, as the information had already been disclosed, the 2006 rider
also contained an evidentiary restriction, which, like a FOIA
exemption, was to be narrowly construed by the court.142 Relying on
this principle, the City of New York court noted that “there [was] no
need to construe this budgetary provision more broadly than necessary
– a construction requiring the assumption that Congress was acting
irrationally and in opposition to its long-standing policy regarding the
administration of justice.”143 In light of FOIA’s long-standing goals

137

Id.
Id. at 780-81
139
See City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 429 F.Supp.2d 517, 526
(E.D.N.Y. 2006).
140
See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 780-82; City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago
II”), 384 F.3d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 2004); City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago I”), 287
F.3d 628, 633 (7th Cir. 2002).
141
See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 781 (holding that the rider refers “generally to
the multiple sales and tracing data, rather than to some subset of the data.”).
142
See City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 528.
143
Id.
138
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and policies,144 the same principle should have guided the court’s
interpretation of the 2005 rider in Chicago III.145
B. FOIA is Wounded by the Seventh Circuit’s Decision
The Seventh Circuit’ decision in Chicago III essentially gave a
green light to those who wish to exploit Exemption 3 of FOIA and
restrict the public’s access to information without debate or question.
Exemption 3, which provides that information specifically exempted
from disclosure by statute may be withheld, combined with Congress’
increasing use of appropriations riders to change substantive law,
widens the potential for government agencies to bypass FOIA’s
disclosure requirements.146 In effect, as the Chicago III decision
demonstrated, a simple rider inserted in a large federal spending bill
may create a new exemption and substantively change FOIA law
without being subject to the formal legislative procedures typically
required for such changes.147 While this problematic use of
appropriations riders is not specific to FOIA,148 the importance of
addressing it in this context has only escalated under the Bush
Administration and its more secretive policies.149 Members of

144

See S. 394 § 2.
See 423 F.3d at 781-82.
146
See generally Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Low Riding, 110 YALE L. J.
1089, 1093-95 (2001) (stating that there has been a significant rise in the number of
substantive laws passed through appropriations legislation in the last half-century,
and calling for modification of this practice and a return to the full and formal
legislative process).
147
Id.; 423 F.3d at 782.
148
See Rapp, supra note 146, at 1093-95.
149
See Jane E. Kirtley, Transparency and Accountability in a Time of Terror:
The Bush Administration’s Assault on Freedom of Information, 11 COMM. L. &
POL’Y 479, 482-84 (2006) (stating that the Bush Administration’s actions have
amounted to an unprecedented “organized assault on freedom of information.”); see
also Joshua Apfelroth, The Open Government Act: A proposed Bill to Ensure the
Efficient Implementation of the Freedom of Information Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 219,
225 (2006) (describing the Bush Administration’s approach to FOIA as
145
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Congress have also expressed their concern on this issue, stating that
“new exemptions should not be created lightly,” and that “individual
statutory exemptions should be vigorously debated before lawmakers
vote in favor of them.”150
Notably, the fear of Exemption 3 becoming overly broad and
inclusive has been addressed by Congress in the past.151 In 1976,
Congress amended Exemption 3 in direct response to the Supreme
Court’s decision in FAA v. Robertson,152 in which the Court held that
general statutory language, without further specification of documents
to be withheld, was sufficient to qualify as an Exemption 3 statute.153
In that amendment, Congress set the specific qualifications criteria in
effect today in order to narrow the number of statutes which could
qualify under the exemption.154 Federal courts were then left with the
task of policing the new standard.155 Considering the Seventh Circuit’s
recent Exemption 3 analysis, and all of the above concerns, the time
may again be ripe for a FOIA amendment.156

“discouraging agencies from disclosing records if the agency can invoke any
technical grounds for withholding them under FOIA.”).
150
See Kirtley, supra note 149, at 507-08 (citing Representative Henry
Waxman and Senator Patrick Leahy’s comments, respectively, in response to two
proposed bills which impact FOIA. One proposed bill provides that “any future
legislation to establish a new exemption to [FOIA] be stated explicitly within the
text of the bill.”).
151
See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice, 1 ADMIN. L. &
PRAC. § 3.38 (2d ed. 2006).
152
422 U.S. 255, 265 (1975).
153
See Koch, supra note 151.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
See City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago III”), 423 F.3d 777, 782 (7th Cir.
2005); see also Kirtley, supra note 149, at 507-08 (provides a brief description of
two proposed bills to reform FOIA, both by promoting public disclosure and an open
government, and both of which may resolve the problems addressed in this Note.
Both bills are still awaiting committee review).
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CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s faulty interpretation of the 2005 rider in
Chicago III not only resulted in an unwarranted substantive change in
FOIA, at least as perceived by the Seventh Circuit,157 but also exposed
a dangerous new loophole in FOIA legislation which could potentially
allow government agencies to unquestionably withhold information
from the public.158 FOIA provides a powerful tool for the American
people, and is a hallmark of our system of democracy.159 Until the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in 2005, FOIA could have provided the
means for the City of Chicago to obtain information with which to
combat gun trafficking and shed light on the activities of ATF.
However, without proper debate or questioning in Congress, the City
of Chicago’s right to this information under FOIA was stripped away.
Congress provided for judicial review of FOIA denials in order to
monitor federal agencies’ claims of secrecy and entitlement to
exemptions.160 It did so with the hope that the judicial review, a vital
part of our constitutional system of checks and balances, would be
more than a mere “judicial sanctioning of agency discretion.”161 Thus,
it is imperative that federal courts continue to thoroughly scrutinize
and narrowly construe both new and existing exemptions to FOIA
which might further restrict FOIA’s purpose and effectiveness.

157

See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 782; City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 429 F.Supp.2d 517, 529 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
158
See Beermann, supra note 50, at 88-89.
159
Meredith Fuchs, supra note 5, at 144 (noting that “Congress designed FOIA
to make democratic participation and citizen oversight a reality.”).
160
Id. at 159.
161
Id.
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